Case 1	:23-cv-05749-CBA-PK Document 46 285	Filed 05/14/24 Page 1 of 34 PageID #:
1	UNITED STAT	TES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT	OF NEW YORK (BROOKLYN)
3	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	Case No. 1:23-cv-05749-CBA-PK
4	Plaintiff,	Case NO. 1.25 CV 05/45 CDA IN
5	v.	Brooklyn, New York April 11, 2024
6	RICHARD J. SCHUELER, a/k/a	10:42 a.m.
7	Richard Heart, et al,	
8	Defendants.	
9	TRANSCRIPT OF INI	TIAL CONFERENCE HEARING
10	BEFORE THE H	NONORABLE PEGGY KUO ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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(Call to order at 10:42 a.m.)

THE CLERK: This is civil cause for initial conference, docket 23-CV-5749, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Richard J. Schueler, et al, Magistrate Judge Peggy Kuo presiding.

Parties present please state their appearances beginning with Plaintiff?

MR. GULDE: Good morning, Your Honor, Matt Gulde for Plaintiff SEC.

MR. KURUVILLA: Good morning, Your Honor, Ben Kuruvilla for the SEC.

MR. LIFTIG: Good morning, for Plaintiff Richard

Heart, Michael Liftig from Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan.

And I have a number of colleagues here. Kristin Tahler also

from Quinn Emanuel and Sam Nitze also from Quinn Emanuel. And

I'll let my co-counsel introduce themselves.

MR. KURUVILLA: David Kirk, Kirk & Ingram for Defendant Richard Heart.

MR. SMITH: Patrick Smith, Clark Smith Villazor for Defendant Richard Heart. Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. This is an initial conference before me. I know that there are other procedural matters pending, but I would like to just give everybody an opportunity to tell me a little bit more about what the case is about in short.

And then, I know there's a motion to stay discovery, so we can talk about that as well. But like I said, since it's an initial conference, I'll just hear from the -- each of the parties what you think are the important factual procedural legal issues that we need to pay attention to as we move forward.

And then, we'll get to the immediate issues at hand. So Mr. Gulde, why don't you start?

MR. GULDE: Sure, Your Honor. May I address you from sitting here?

THE COURT: Yes, as long as you're talking into the microphone so that it can be picked up.

MR. GULDE: This is a case that the SEC brought last summer against Defendant Richard Heart, who is apparently in Helsinki, Finland. Also included with him in the caption are Hex, PulseChain, and PulseX. We've described those as unincorporated alter ego entities of Mr. Heart.

This case is about Richard Heart developing Hex, PulseChain, and PulseX crypto asset securities and raising roughly a billion dollars.

And so -- in so doing, he raised this money from investors all over the world, but including the United States. He engaged at least one developer, possibly more in the United States, to develop the crypto currencies and platforms. And he targeted American investors and received investment from

American investors in amassing that billion dollars.

So this is a case about the unregistered offer and sale of securities in those three forms in selling Hex, in selling PulseX, in selling PulseChain, and their related tokens of the same -- we can call them the same names Hex, PulseX, PulseChain or Pulse related to PulseChain.

It's also a case about Richard Heart and through
PulseChain defrauding the investors in PulseChain. In
the -- in raising, let's see, more than \$300 million from
PulseChain investors, Mr. Heart used millions of that money
directly from investors in PulseChain for his own luxury
purposes, buying fancy cars, buying fancy watches.

We're able to trace those purchases that went through a complicated crypto currency mixer to apparently to disguise the comings and goings of those assets, but they went to purchase luxury items for him.

We're here today under the procedural stance that we are because we haven't been able to come to an agreement about whether discovery ought to move forward.

One big reason we haven't is because during the investigative stage, we were -- the SEC was able to serve Mr. Heart in a Miami airport with a subpoena during the investigative stage.

That subpoena lawfully requested documents from him related to the development, the rollout of Hex, where's the

money, what did you with the money, where did the money come from, who did you pay to develop this thing, all those sorts of questions.

He ignored that subpoena. So the SEC had a choice at that point. And I'll also say that in addition to Mr. Heart ignoring that subpoena, the SEC served several subpoenas to people we believed to be promoters and developers of Hex. And they also with very few exceptions ignored those subpoenas.

So, at that point in the late summer of '22, the SEC could have gone forward with a bunch of miscellaneous actions to try to compel or to move forward with what we had.

You see in the complaint the results of moving forward with what we had. We believe that there is more to know here and that the interests of the public favor moving forward with discovery to develop the more fulsome picture of the story of Richard Heart, Hex, PulseX, and PulseChain. So that's our nutshell.

THE COURT: Uh-huh, okay, thank you. So I'll hear from the Defendants.

MR. LIFTIK: Thank you, Your Honor. Obviously, we vigorously dispute the characterization of the facts, but I want to focus on just a few items.

First of all, counsel repeatedly used the word investors. We reject that and that actually basically presumes the precise question that's at issue in this case, which is

whether or not these tokens are in fact securities under the federal securities laws.

It is very clear from the record that this is not a case where money was raised from traditional investors, venture investors, or offer, you know, private investors and then a platform was a built.

In other words, one critical distinction that this case has from many of the other crypto cases that is not clear from Mr. Gulde's presentation is that this is not an ICO case, an initial coin offering case. This is not a case where sums of money were raised, a platform was built, and then it was later launched.

Hex was launched fully built before a nickel flowed into the Hex block chain. And that has very significant implications for the securities analysis.

We've also moved to dismiss. And under Judge Amon's rules, we lodge that with the Commission staff, but we don't file it on her docket until briefing is complete.

We brought a copy of the motion to dismiss if it would be helpful for Your Honor to review it. We can either transmit it electronically, but we also have a copy here if you'd like.

In brief, and I think this begins to get to why we believe a stay of discovery is appropriate, we argue that there are very strong personal jurisdictional defenses.

As counsel acknowledged, Mr. Heart is not in the United States. We don't believe the record, particularly as alleged in the complaint, establishes that he purposely availed himself of this forum.

One of the things that is actually quite interesting is the letter that counsel filed on Tuesday. We actually think that strengthens our case.

In counsel's letter on Tuesday, they have introduced new facts that were not alleged in the complaint. That is in the letter.

You can -- I'm happy to point you to those, but we think we've already hit a nerve with our motion that there are failings in the complaint and it has not alleged sufficient facts to put him here in the United States subject to this Court's jurisdiction.

In addition, the securities laws require that the alleged domestic transactions in securities under the <u>Morrison</u>

<u>v. National Australia Bank</u> case, we believe and we argue in our motion to dismiss that the SEC has failed to allege domestic transactions.

Simply pointing to the fact that people in the United States may have acquired Hex tokens is insufficient under <a href="Morrison">Morrison</a> and the supporting case law such as absolute activist. So much they're controlling 2nd Circuit case. They actually need to allege where irrevocable liability was incurred. And

the complaint does not do that.

We raise arguments concerning whether or not they've alleged the foundational contract required under the investment contract analysis under the securities laws.

And then, we've also raised, and this is novel to this case, but we think a critically important issue First Amendment arguments.

Much of the complaint focuses on the words that Mr. Heart said. And the complaint alleges that those words, the words that they have cherry picked out of hours and hours of YouTube videos that Mr. Heart recorded make this code, these Hex tokens a security.

Now one of the things that the complaint does is it dismisses out of hand other words that Mr. Heart said where he explicitly disavows particular aspects that the Commission would need to show to establish a security.

So this case presents really an interesting case where some of -- under the Commission's use, some of Mr.

Heart's word create a security, but they ignore the other words that show why it's not a security. So we think that that actually raises important First Amendment issues.

In addition, counsel mentioned the PulseChain and PulseX projects. Those projects were explicitly undertook with a free speech direction.

The idea was that people contributed to that project

if they -- to show that they believe in free speech, that they believe in blockchain.

And those very express words again that the Commission chooses to ignore where Mr. Heart said you're sacrificing your money. I promise you nothing. If you donate to this project, the money is gone. Nothing will come of it.

So there are some very serious hurdles that we think the Commission has not and cannot overcome on the pleadings.

It's a bit of a sidebar, but it's also worth noting that the caption, these three entities Hex, PulseChain, and PulseX that are in the complaint, we here at counsel table only represent Mr. Heart.

And something that's going to be grappled with and needs to be grappled we think is another reason why the motion to stay is appropriate is we don't really understand how they purport to name these three entities as Defendants, or they're not entities, I misspoke.

Hex as they allege is a token. It's a piece of code. PulseChain, they allege purports to be a fork of the Ethereum blockchain. So post chain is a database.

And PulseX, they describe as a decentralized protocol on the Ethereum block chain. Again, code.

We're quite frankly confused as to how you can name bits of code as Defendants, how you can say that bits of code are alter egos. That needs to be resolved before we can

proceed with discovery.

There's more to say on the motion to stay. So I know I've gone a little bit past it. And I'm happy to continue or if Your Honor has questions before we get to that.

THE COURT: I did. So you say that you're representing Mr. Heart, not Hex, PulseChain, or PulseX?

MR. LIFTIK: That's correct.

THE COURT: So is anybody representing those three entities?

MR. LIFTIK: Not that we're aware of, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, technically, they would be in default by not being represented?

MR. LIFTIK: I don't --

THE COURT: They're named as Defendants, and whether they're proper Defendants or not is a different issue, but if you're clearly not representing them, then the procedural posture is that they will be in default.

And you're not here to speak on behalf of them whether they're entities or code or something else. So we just want to be clear that they're -- they, if they were found to be proper entities are in default by virtue of not appearing?

MR. LIFTIK: Well, I don't think they've been served.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. So, okay. That sounds good.

And I also notice everybody's been saying Mr. Heart, even though the caption is Mr. Schueler. So is Mr. Schueler not his

name? It's Mr. Heart?

MR. LIFTIK: His preferred name is Mr. Heart. His legal name is Mr. Schueler.

THE COURT: Okay, okay, so we should be calling him Mr. Heart. And then, I understand that your motion to dismiss is on two grounds, personal jurisdiction and First Amendment; is that right?

MR. LIFTIK: It's on a number of grounds. It's on personal jurisdiction, so 12(b)(2). And then 12(b)(6) and the grounds for the motion include what we call the Morrison argument, what we call the no contract argument, the First Amendment argument.

And then, they've also alleged a fraud claim. And so under Rule 9(b), we've alleged that or we contend that they've not met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).

THE COURT: All right, okay. And the Morrison argument is a personal jurisdiction one, isn't it?

MR. LIFTIK: It is not actually, Your Honor.

Morrison is a substantive holding that is not a jurisdictional holding, even though it sounds in jurisdiction or standing, but it's been held not to be.

THE COURT: Right. And for personal jurisdiction purposes, not every fact needs to be within the four corners of the complaint, right? Personal jurisdiction could be based on things that are developed as facts on the record. It doesn't

MR. LIFTIK: We're aware that it can extend the four corners. What we had when we filed our motion to dismiss was only the four corners of the complaint.

And if Commission would choose to put forth evidence to -- then we can sort of address that in supplemental briefing.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LIFTIK: The point that I wish to raise in their letter is that they've already started to bring in some without citation, they've started to bring in extra allegations, but there's no citations. There's no evidence. They've just started to allege additional I guess I call them facts, but they're not really before us.

THE COURT: Right. And the motion to dismiss has been served. The opposition has not yet been served. So you don't --

MR. LIFTIK: I don't what the arguments will be, correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, that's fair, thank you. So thank you for that overview. That was very helpful.

Let me hear then with regard to discovery what the Commission is intending to be the scope of the discovery and if you have any kind of plan in terms of the stages of the discovery that you're proposing.

And then, I'll hear from the Defendant as far -- and I'll just say Defendant because it's you're only the one about why that should not go forward, okay?

So, Mr. Gulde, I'll hear from you.

MR. GULDE: Sure, Your Honor. Our first ask is that we move forward with discovery as it would be in any case where we would serve discovery, both written discovery, document discovery, and eventually, a deposition, but that wouldn't be right away from Mr. Heart.

And notably, although we mentioned in our letter it does answer some of the complexity here, you know, we believe we've served Hex, PulseX, and PulseChain to the extent you can serve them.

And granted, there is some uncertainty here partially because we weren't able to conduct a fulsome investigation because of Mr. Heart's noncompliance.

But we do believe they had been served. But we also believe as we said in our letter that anything that we'd be seeking of Hex, PulseX, PulseChain could be answered by the human being Richard Heart.

So our ask would be to just start with discovery. We don't need depositions right away. That can wait from the parties through Mr. Heart.

And then also, on a -- on the same track, immediately start discovery on those third-parties that we mentioned

including promoters, developers of Hex, PulseX, and PulseChain.

We are happy to discuss fallback positions if the Court is reluctant to let discovery go forward on that sort of full spectrum.

One that makes sense immediately would be something that would give the SEC access to materials that we asked for 19 months ago as part of the investigation. So document discovery from Mr. Heart related to all of these offerings, coinciding with an effort to open up full discovery as to third-parties.

And I don't believe that would prejudice the

Defendants because they've got plenty of folks to handle

defending any of those depositions or raising any issues that

they see fit.

So, you know, that's our big ask. And then, that's our fallback.

THE COURT: Okay, for purposes of responding to the motion to dismiss, do you need discovery?

MR. GULDE: Need is a tough question. I don't think we need it. To represent my client ably, I think I do say we need it because there are things that are left to be found from Mr. Heart from third-parties that would certainly be relevant.

So while I think we can survive a motion to dismiss without it, that would not be competent advocacy. And we should absolutely seek additional discovery to what we have

right now to ably do that.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I shouldn't be so cryptic.

Do you need personal jurisdiction discovery because I've seen that happen in other cases where if the challenge is to personal jurisdiction, sometimes the party defending says I don't actually know. I -- we have this kind of information, but we need more discovery to get the full spectrum.

MR. GULDE: Maybe I'm being too cute. I'm confident where we are.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine.

MR. GULDE: But yes, we need it in that we're going to seek it and it will definitely be relevant to the issues of personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's just a dispute as to the word need, okay.

MR. GULDE: But I think it's a yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And for the third-party, those are nonparties. So you mentioned that the Defendant might want his lawyers present, but you're not seeking the discovery? The promoters and developers as far as you know are as you call them third-parties nonparties?

MR. GULDE: Your Honor, I don't know -- I have no idea if they're represented by any of these folks or if they are associated with Mr. Heart in a way that would make them parties to this case or aligned with the party in the case.

And I mention that just to say that they certainly can attend the depositions of those folks.

THE COURT: Right, but in assessing burden, that's -- that would be the extent of burden there might be on the Defendant?

MR. GULDE: That's right.

THE COURT: Yeah, okay, very good. Thank you.

So Mr. Liftik or somebody else with Defendant?

MR. LIFTIK: Thank you, Your Honor. Just taking a step back and looking at the test for why we believe that a stay of discovery is warranted, it's a three factor test as I'm sure Your Honor is familiar with.

Strong showing that the claim is unmeritorious, breadth of the discovery that is sought, and the prejudice might be, that might be suffered by the other side.

We want to really just focus on -- walk through those briefly. On the merits of the motion to dismiss, why we believe the claim is unmeritorious for these purposes, we're really focusing on two arguments, the personal jurisdiction argument and the Morrison argument. Our Rule 9(b) obviously does not dispose of the entire case, so we're putting that aside for these purposes.

There's a number of cases that support us. We think the Vida Press (phonetic), Eastern District of New York 2022 and the Paladino (phonetic) case of Eastern District of New

York in 2024, those are magistrate judge orders granting stays of discovery.

And we think they're particularly instructive because there's motions to dismiss raise personal jurisdiction challenges.

And the Paladino case actually goes even further. I think there's a nice analogy in one of the arguments in a motion to dismiss was an anti-trust standing argument.

That's a -- I'd say that's sort of a rough analogy to the <u>Morrison</u> argument in terms of whether or not there's even a domestic securities transaction such that the case can go forward for the Commission.

So, you know, obviously, I'm not here to have a hearing on a motion to dismiss, but on personal jurisdiction, I think Your Honor only needs to look to Judge Amon's Plexcorp. (phonetic) case, which essentially reads like a checklist of the things not alleged in the complaint.

In that case, they allege business travel to the United States. They allege the use of U.S.-based payment systems. And they alleged transactions on a website that was hosted and purchased from a U.S. website hoster.

None of those things are alleged in our complaint.

And we think that the record and our motion establishes that he didn't reach out and avail himself of the forum in any capacity, which is as required under the SPV Osus (phonetic)

case, which is 2nd Circuit from 2018.

Any statements made by Mr. Heart on the Internet, those are general statements. There's a pretty robust body of case law that talks about simply taking advantage of the Internet does not create jurisdiction in the United States.

The Commission has raised the issue that part of the technologies that we're talking about here are based on something called Uniswap, which is an existing decentralized exchange.

And they make the point that Uniswap was developed by people who live in Brooklyn. Well, if we unwind that a little bit, there's no allegation or could there be that Mr. Heart is affiliated in any way with Uniswap.

And so, simply saying that because Uniswap is based in the United States or the developers, Uniswap is descentralized, it's all over the world, but the Uniswap developers were based in Brooklyn, if you build something based on that, that gives you jurisdiction.

And that's essentially like saying if you issue

French bonds from a French company, but you base the bond

indenture on a form that you found from the United States, that

those French bonds would be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. It

just doesn't track.

THE COURT: Where was your client when he made these statements?

1 MR. LIFTIK: Well, they're outside the United States, 2 entirely outside the United States. 3 THE COURT: Okay, so and the statements you said were 4 just on the Internet, not directed at the United States? 5 MR. LIFTIK: Correct. These are posted generally for 6 anyone in the world to see on the Internet. 7 THE COURT: And where would they posted? 8 MR. LIFTIK: YouTube and other channels. 9 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. I was just curious about 10 that. 11 MR. LIFTIK: Sure. There's -- the Commission arques 12 in their letter that Morrison does not apply to Section 5 13 There's contrary authority to that. 14 The Hallsworth v. Bee Protocol (phonetic) case and 15 the recent decision by Judge Torres in the Southern District in 16 the Whipple (phonetic) case established that Morrison can be 17 used to show that you need to allege a domestic transaction for 18 a Section 5, which is the unregistered transactions allegation 19 that they have. 20 So the point, and obviously we can get into more 21 here, but the point is that these are strong arguments that we 22 believe pose a serious threat to the entire action. 23 On the burden and the breadth of discovery, let's 24 pause and focus on the subpoena that Mr. Gulde mentioned. The

SEC has had extensive opportunity, unique opportunities as a

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civil litigant, that regular civil litigants don't have to conduct in investigation before they file their action.

And as Mr. Gulde has described, they alleged they served a subpoena on Mr. Heart. They also allege that they served all kinds of other manner of subpoenas on third-parties. And then, they did nothing.

THE COURT: Well, I thought that Mr. Gulde's description was that your client, ignored the subpoena that was properly served.

MR. LIFTIK: They're alleging Mr. Heart did not respond to the subpoena, but the SEC has unique tools.

THE COURT: But did he respond to the subpoena and they just missed it?

MR. LIFTIK: No, he did not.

THE COURT: Okay, so he didn't respond?

MR. LIFTIK: He did not respond to the subpoena, but they did not move to compel. They did not seek to follow up with him in any way.

We're not aware of any miscellaneous actions seeking to compel production of documents for any of these third-parties that they have subpoenaed.

The idea that it's now been 19 months since that subpoena was served, the idea that suddenly now we need to engage in discovery when they could have pursued other remedies, it's not to say discovery shouldn't happen at some

point, but to let they play out, let all jurisdictional arguments play out it's particularly in part where you're talking about a defendant that is not in the United States.

So the idea of Mr. Heart being subjected to discovery in our contention that is that this Court does not have jurisdiction over him is why we're particularly moving here for a stay of discovery.

Let's also look at what we think the burden could be.

And we're not here to argue that there aren't lawyers to help

deal with it.

But the subpoena that the investigative subpoena that the SEC attached to their letter gives us a roadmap for what they would ask for.

And it's exceptionally broad. They seek all kinds of personal financial information from Mr. Heart, all these communications with participants in the Hex project or any individual discussing Hex is a virtually unrestricted request for Mr. Heart's communications over years relating to this project that they allege he's been at the center of. All documents related to the development of Hex. That -- extensive documents.

So, you know, we know that the -- we know that the -- we're going to be fighting about a very broad subpoena if regular discovery were to open.

And then, we have this issue of the parties. In

1 their investigative subpoena, they refer to Hex the way one 2 would refer to a company. They say Hex includes all its 3 parents and affiliates, et cetera, et cetera. 4 Well, we've got to resolve this. Just because they 5 allege that it's a unincorporated entity doesn't make it so. 6 THE COURT: How will it be resolved? 7 MR. LIFTIK: Well, I mean, our contention is that Mr. 8 Heart only has his own documents and there is no Hex's code. 9 That's our position. And I think it's their burden to 10 establish that somehow Hex is something other than that. 11 If we go to the risk of prejudice, as we've talked 12 about, we think that there's very little risk of prejudice. 13 They -- the Commission's been content to let these subpoenas go 14 unresponded to for, you know, 19 months now. 15 And so waiting a few more months for the motion to 16 dismiss, process to play itself out, we don't believe would 17 hurt the Commission's interests here. 18 All that said, Your Honor, you know, while we believe 19 that discovery should be stayed as we put in the record, we did 20 approach the Commission about limited discovery and we weren't 21 able to -- well, they said, no, they needed full discovery. So 22 that's fundamentally why we're here today. THE COURT: Okay, and what is your proposal for 23 24 limited discovery?

MR. LIFTIK: I'm confident that if your order were to

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honor it -- order it, we could have a productive meet and confer and come up with some agreement, but we believe that there are some ways to limit discovery.

Off the top of my head, some of the ideas could be Rule 26 disclosures and perhaps some limited RFPs. Another way to approach it will be to talk about producing actual documents but leave e-coms, you know, emails and messages, et cetera for later because that's where things start to get very burdensome and significant.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, great.

And Mr. Gulde, I don't remember if you addressed the three-prong test particularly. So I'll just give you a quick opportunity if you want to.

MR. GULDE: Sure, sure, I'm happy to. Excuse me.

I'm happy to do that. You know, whether -- I mean, the main

idea in this case and why we led with it is our prejudice. And

I think characterizing us as being content to let 19 months run

is a little bit off the mark.

As I said before, we -- the SEC was presented with a very difficult choice in terms of how to try to marshal evidence in this case.

And instead of pursuing multitudinous miscellaneous actions, we chose to go forward as we have, believing that we could kick in the discovery process to obtain needed evidence.

And notably, I'm not sure we would be having exactly

this conversation if not for Mr. Heart's claim when he was describing this in his letter to the Court overtly saying that the SEC is not prejudiced because we've basically had a bite at this apple.

To make that claim while knowing you were served with a subpoena, it was galling to me. So that's why I've reacted as I have there.

The SEC, as we've stated, is at risk of further spoliation of evidence. And we represent the public interest here. It's hackneyed, but justice delayed is justice denied. And the people, it's my obligation to argue on behalf of the people to air this information and figure out what was really happening here.

As to the two main arguments that they've made about personal jurisdiction and extraterritoriality, I would ask Mr. Kuruvilla to discuss it.

MR. KURUVILLA: Sure, Your Honor. So just to step back for a second, Your Honor, just to address a point that Mr. Liftik made earlier about one part of their motion, which is that these offerings are not securities, I would just -- and my understanding of the basis of that argument is that there was not a formal contract here between the issuer and the investor.

The test for determining whether or not these assets are securities is set forth in the well-known  $\underline{\text{SEC v. Howey}}$  case.

And the elements for that test are whether or not there's an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profit from the efforts of the developers.

And it's our position and we've pled it in the complaint that the -- that each of those offerings clearly meet the <u>Howey</u> test and that there are -- courts have rejected this argument that there needs to be a formal contract of some sort in order to establish or meet the definition of an investment contract under the definition of what a security is.

So we believe that that, you know, portion of the motion is -- as the others are, you know, without merit and that'll be shown, you know, we haven't put together our opposition, but just previewing what our arguments would be.

As far as personal jurisdiction is concerned, there we have pled enough in the complaint in our view to clearly establish personal jurisdiction.

There are -- the standard of course is whether or not there's been a purposeful availment. There's minimum contacts in the United States or in the forum state.

Mr. Heart marketed these offerings. And there is a body of case law and I would say even the Plexcorp case, which Mr. Liftik referenced, in that case, one of the basis that the Court set forth was that contacts were created in the forum state by marketing via the Internet. So that was what was done here. He marketed over social media and websites.

There's at least one investor that we know of in Brooklyn who invested in the -- in Hex-based I believe Hex or Pulse with the expectation that there was going to be a -- there was going to be profit by purchasing this digital security. So that's one investor that we know of for sure who's in New York.

One-third -- our understanding is that one-third of the web traffic that occurred during the Hex offering came from the United States. And so, Mr. Heart was clearly aware that his marketing efforts were making contacts in the United States.

And as I said, at least one investor that we know of is in Brooklyn. And there's the additional fact that we have in our letter that he -- that Mr. Heart engaged with a developer in the U.S. to help program the software for I believe Hex.

So we believe there's enough in the complaint to establish, you know, personal jurisdiction. So -- we and again, we'll formulate these arguments further in our opposition.

With respect to the Morrison arguments about extraterritoriality, the -- anti-fraud provisions -- let me step back. Congress with the Dodd Frank Act we believe it's our position overrode the <u>Morrison</u> case with respect to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.

And it's no longer the test that there has to be a domestic transaction in a security in order for the anti-fraud security provisions to extend extraterritorially.

The test rather is the test that existed before

Morrison, which is a conduct and effects test. And that's

whether or not there's conduct taken in a foreign jurisdiction

that has a foreseeable substantial effect in -- domestically in

the United States.

And we believe all the facts that I laid earlier with respect to personal jurisdiction, the marketing efforts that were the markets of websites, through social media to the United States, that these would establish that, you know, this conduct while taken in a foreign jurisdiction clearly had the effect of creating a securities market here in the United States.

So, again, these are all arguments that we'll flush out further in the opposition, but we believe they're meritorious arguments and that, you know, the motion will be defeated.

MR. GULDE: And I'm realizing I didn't hit the third one, burden to other folks. A lot is being made of the various names on the caption, but as we said in our letter, Richard Heart can answer these things. And he's a guy who raised a billion. And he's hired all these lawyers to come here. I think he can answer this with -- and recognize that litigation

is no joke. And I'm not minimizing that there is a burden on him, but it is not an undue burden.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

So, thank you, everybody. That was excellent and extremely helpful.

So I'm going to apply the third-part test. The first is whether there's a strong showing that Plaintiff's claims are unmeritorious.

And here, the parties have given me a preview of what the motion to dismiss and the opposition will look like. And I can't say that it is a strong showing of lack of merit. I am not in a position to rule on that. That is up to Judge Amon, but on its face, I can't say that there's a strong showing that there's no merit to the claims here.

As far as the prejudice to the Plaintiff, I see that the Commission has been trying to investigate this case. And there are many gaps in its knowledge. I haven't heard that it's specific information as to the time sensitivity, but I think as time does go by, it -- there is going to be prejudice.

I see the motion to dismiss is not going to be fully briefed until August. There's oral argument in October. And so, it could be next year by the time there's a decision on that.

And I don't -- I think in that time, things can get lost. I'm also very concerned as I think Defendant recognizes

that the issue of who the parties are needs to be resolved quickly as well so that we can move forward.

And if it's an open issue as to whether Hex, Pulse, and PulseX are properly sued and should be brought in, I think that needs to be resolved sooner rather than later so that by the time the motion to dismiss is resolved, we're clear on who they are, whether they're represented, whether they've been served, and we can go forward.

So if we were to wait and those questions are -- remain unanswered, I think there is prejudice both to the Commission and also to the conduct of this litigation.

And then, the final part about the burden, I appreciate that there's always going to be some burden, but I don't find that it's an undue burden based on the fact that this case is -- there isn't a strong showing that the case is going to be dismissed, and therefore, that Mr. Heart would be relieved of any obligation to engage in litigation.

And so, given where we are since it's -- and in light of the fact that there is quite a bit of third-party discovery that needs to go forward, I think the burden on Mr. Heart is not -- weighing everything, I don't think it outweighs the need for the discovery in this case.

I also consider Mr. Liftik's proposal that you not engage in electronic discovery until later. I don't think that's a good idea, because it seems to me that almost

everything in this case is likely to be electronic, given the way the facts have been described. So while that is sometimes appropriate, I don't think that that makes sense here.

Now if the parties want to engage in a discussion as to how the discovery should go forward in an orderly and efficient and effective way, you're free to do that.

So, it may be that you can get discovery very quickly on these three mystery Defendants to figure out who exactly they are, and can they be sued, and have they been served, and who can -- how they can appear, I think that that should go forward quickly.

Which is not to say that the other information, other discovery should not go forward, but if the clients -- if the parties want to have a discussion about how to move forward, you're free to do that. And so, I will require that you meet and confer and come up with a discovery plan.

And so, like I said, you're free to stage the discovery in the coming months to say this part will happen by this date, this will happen by that date, but I do need to have a proposed discovery plan, so that I can enter a scheduling order in this case and let the motion to dismiss play out before Judge Amon according to her schedule.

So why don't I give the parties three weeks to come up with a discovery plan? And that will take us to May 2nd.

So no later than May 2nd, I would like to see a proposed -- a

joint proposed scheduling order.

I have a form that you can fill out. I think it's useful to have it in that grid format, but if the parties want to do something else, and like I said if you want to be more detailed as to interim deadlines, you're free to do that, okay, but use that as a guide.

And you should have dates for the completion of fact discovery. And then, if you're intending to have expert discovery, a proposal for that as well.

And then, I will consider it. If it's clear based on what you've submitted to me that there aren't any disputes and you're proposing that and if it looks reasonable, I can certainly just enter it, but if I have any questions or if the parties have disputes as to the content of that discovery, I will have another conference and then we can talk about it.

Okay.

So, at the interim conferences, I tend to have by phone because I think that way, I can schedule them more quickly. My goal is always when I see a dispute that the parties have raised jointly to just schedule it within a matter of days.

The initial conference, it's useful to have everybody in person and I appreciate seeing everybody. But just to let you know, unless there's a good reason to bring everybody in, I usually do that by phone, which again, is not to say that if

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